Appreciation of the quantum of sentence is explained

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Appeal

Appeal against the judgment of confirming the trial court’s conviction by High Court

2. Ehsaan, the appellant-convict is aggrieved by judgment and order dated 1 st November 2017 by the High Court of Delhi which affirmed the finding of conviction and sentence returned in terms of orders dated 7th June 2017 and 9th June 2017 by the Additional Sessions Judge, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi under Section 376-D Indian Penal Code, 1860. The sentence awarded was rigorous imprisonment for life that is till the remainder to natural life and payment of a fine of Rs.25,000 to the victim, PW-2, in default whereof simple imprisonment for two years. The context in which the aforesaid sentence came to be eventually imposed was that a call was received at the Police Station, I.P. Estate, New Delhi, that by the first informant ‘benami’ that two accused persons had committed rape on the victim PW-2. She had, at night-time took a rickshaw from the Delhi Railway Station on the assurance that the driver would drop her off at her home but instead of doing so, he took her to a deserted place where another person was already present and they proceeded to commit the offence of rape, leading to the registration of FIR No.0411 dated 7th September 2016.

Appeal only confined to quantum of sentence

3. At the outset, it may be noted that while issuing notice on 5 th January 2026, this Court refused to interfere with the conviction and issued notice only confined to the quantum of sentence.

Imposing sentence of remainder of natural life

4. The Trial Court in imposing the sentence of remainder of natural life considered the judgments of this Court in inter alia State of Punjab v. Saurabh Bakshi; Gopal Singh v. State of Uttarakhand; State of Punjab v. Bawa Singh. The reasoning to come to the finding of guilt was based on the evidence of the victim, PW-2 and witness PW8 discussed in para 9 to 16 and 25 to 28 of the Trial Court judgment. The paragraphs dealing with the sentence are as follows:

“…After going through the aforesaid conceptus of judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court, it is clear that both the convicts committed a heinous crime of gang rape on a hapless lady who had forgot her way to her destination. Instead of helping her accused Ehsaan induced her to accompany him to the place of incident on the pretext of dropping her at her destination where his associate co-accused Umesh Giri joined him & they both in furtherance of their common intention committed gang rape on her. Hence, considering the manner of commission of offence, brutality inflicted by accused persons in injury and act of both the convicts and submissions of the parties, I am of the opinion that ends of justice would only meet if the convicts namely Umesh Giri and Ehsaan are sentenced as under: For offence punishable under section 376-D IPCC, the above named convicts are sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for life which shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of convicts natural life, in addition to payment of fine of Rs. 25,000/- each, to be paid to the victim and default whereof, they shall also undergo two years S.I…”

The High Court has independently considered the evidence of record and recorded its agreement, in toto with the Trial Court.

Analysis

5. Heard learned counsel for the appellant and learned ASG for the respondent and perused the written submissions.

6. The offence committed upon the victim is, without any manner of doubt, grave. We are only to examine whether the sentence concurrently imposed upon him, satisfies the doctrine of proportionality or not, in the attending facts and circumstances of this case. As such, a brief foray into the doctrine and its application would be justified.

6.1 P.N. Bhagwati J. as he then was in his dissenting opinion on the aspect of constitutionality of the death penalty provided under Section 302 IPC Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, held as under:

“36. Now it is an essential element of the rule of law that the sentence imposed must be proportionate to the offence. If a law provides for imposition of a sentence which is disproportionate to the offence, it would be arbitrary and irrational, for it would not pass the test of reason and would be contrary to the rule of law and void under Articles 14, 19 and 21. The principle of proportionality is implicit in these three Articles of the Constitution. If, for example, death penalty was prescribed for the simple offence of theft — as indeed it was at one time in the seventeenth century England — it would be clearly excessive and wholly disproportionate to the offence and hence arbitrary and irrational by any standards of human decency and it would be impossible to sustain it against the challenge of these three Articles of the Constitution. It must therefore be taken to be clear beyond doubt that the proportionality principle constitutes an important constitutional criterion for adjudging the validity of a sentence imposed by law.

6.2 Surya Kant J. (as he then was) in Surinder Singh v. State (UT of Chandigarh) discussed the doctrine of proportionality in the following terms:

“………..”

6.3 In State of Karnataka v. Krishnappa three judge Bench of this Court observed as follows to the effect that a retributive view in cases involving the offence of rape is entirely justified:

“………”

The view above was referred to by a Bench of equal strength in Shimbhu v. State of Haryana.

6.4 When a sentence is imposed on an offender, it is done so with trifold purpose i.e. punitive, deterrent and protective. The overall objective is to rid the society of criminal proclivity. The same is done by ensuring that the sentence imposed is proportional to the offence or in other words not overly influenced by the possibility of reformation and instead, striking a judicious balance between the interest of the victim, society and the accused, after following the due process of law. We have considered a number of other judgments also inter-alia Allauddin Mian v. State of Bihar; Navas v. State of Kerala; Sevaka Perumal v. State of T.N; and Parsuram v. State of M.P. The following aspects reveal themselves when viewed from the lens of imposition of sentence. It must:

(a) Be in accordance with the nature and gravity of the crime;

(b) Adequately protect the interest of the society;

(c) Take into account the deterrent purpose of punishment;

(d) Consider the motive behind the crime, if any;

(e) Give due weight to the conduct of the accused;

(f) Examine whether the crime in question was pre-meditated or not;

(g) Keep in view the age of the accused and whether he has engaged in any similar offence in past for which he has been duly convicted;

(h) Account for the number of victims of the offence;

(i) Not consider the religion, race, caste or creed of the offender as a factor;

(j) Consider the possibility of reformation of the accused. It is the duty of the State to establish that the same does not exist; and

(k) The abuse of trust or misuse of personal relationship, if any.

The facets identified by us above are illustrative and not exhaustive. A holistic view of the entire case must be taken in the attending facts of each case. Considering all these factors among others, the foremost duty of the Court is to assess the evidence in a given case; imposing just and adequate punishment upon the accused.

Judgments regarding modification of sentence

7. In this part, we must consider the precedents wherein sentence has been modified by the Court either from capital punishment to rigorous imprisonment for life or for an otherwise fixed term.

7.1 In Shankar Kisanrao Khade v. State of Maharashtra, a two judge Bench, was considering an appeal of the convict who had kidnapped, raped and murdered an intellectually disabled 11-year-old girl. The High Court of Judicature of Bombay, had awarded the death sentence, but this Court reduced the same to rigorous imprisonment for life having considered four aspects – the enormity of the crime; satisfaction of the criminal test; the previous criminal record of the accused even though the same was held to be incorrectly considered by the High Court; and the non-reporting of the offence of sexual assault.

7.2 In Rajkumar v. State of M.P., this Court altered the death sentence, on a conviction under Section 376 IPC, to 35 years of RI without remission, upholding the conviction of an uncle for having committed breach of trust since she was in his care and custody.

7.3 In Selvam v. State a three-judge Bench of this Court while examining the correctness of conviction and sentence of the appellant having been convicted of rape and murder, refused to interfere with the conviction but modified the sentence to minimum thirty years without remission.

7.4 In Parsuram v. State of M.P., the sentence of death awarded to a tutor for having committed rape and murder of a student was modified to actual imprisonment of 30 years on account of the fact that the Courts below did not consider (a) the possibility of reformation; (b) lack of criminal antecedents; and (c) the age of the accused at the time of the offence which was 22 years.

7.5 In Sundar v. State a three judge Bench had while upholding the conviction of the accused on the aspect of kidnapping and murdering a seven year old victim modified the sentence to a minimum of twenty years RI without remission considering that at the time of the offence the accused was 23 years old, had no prior antecedent, had maintained a good conduct in prison and had also made efforts to mend his ways in anticipation of release.

7.6 In Ravinder Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) the Court while examining the conviction of a father accused of having raped his own daughter, observed that the conviction cannot be disturbed. The aspect of sentence, it was observed had to be enhanced should the view be that the father will be eligible for remission after 14 years since at the time of release the victim will be still in her 20s and so his presence in her life will be greatly disturbing. Sentence was modified to fixed terms of 20 years.

Conclusion

Judicial discretion in reducing the sentence

9. It also must be observed that the offence under which the appellant-convict has been sentenced, Section 376D IPC was substituted by way of the 2013 Criminal Law Amendment being Act 13 of 2013 which was brought in the aftermath of the horrifying Nirbhaya incident that took place on the streets of the capital. There it has been made clear that for this offence, minimum sentence is of twenty years, and the maximum is that has been imposed upon the appellant convict i.e., life imprisonment for the remainder of natural life. It appears quite plainly that considering the nature of the offence, the Legislature first made it an independent offence and then also provided for a minimum punishment. The Court, therefore, has no other alternative and must, upon convicting, impose at least the minimum sentence. The judicial discretion in reducing the same by recording ‘adequate and special reasons’ which was given in proviso to the unamended Section 376 has been taken away. This indicates legislative recognition of the seriousness of the offence which the Courts must abide by.

Sentence modified to 20 years

10. Considering the principles discussed above and applying them to the factors accruing in favour of the appellant – convict noted earlier, we deem it appropriate to modify the sentence to 20 years with benefit of remission, if any. The appeal is partly allowed.

Resources

Judgments Cited, Quoted, or Referred To

  • Sevaka Perumal v. State of T.N. (1991) 3 SCC 471: Cited regarding the principle that sentencing process must be stern where necessary and tempered with mercy where warranted.
  • State of Punjab v. Saurabh Bakshi (2015) 5 SCC 182: Cited by the Trial Court while imposing the sentence of imprisonment for the remainder of natural life.
  • Gopal Singh v. State of Uttarakhand (2013) 7 SCC 545: Cited by the Trial Court in support of its sentencing reasoning.
  • State of Punjab v. Bawa Singh (2015) 3 SCC 441: Cited by the Trial Court regarding sentencing standards for heinous offences.
  • Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (1982) 3 SCC 24: Quoted the dissenting opinion of P.N. Bhagwati, J., holding that proportionality in sentencing is implicit in Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Constitution.
  • Surinder Singh v. State (UT of Chandigarh) (2021) 20 SCC 24: Quoted on the doctrine of proportionality, the gravity of the offence, and balancing deterrence with rehabilitative justice.
  • State of Karnataka v. Krishnappa (2000) 4 SCC 75: Quoted to affirm that a severe, retributive approach is justified in heinous cases of rape to protect society and reflect public abhorrence.
  • Shimbhu v. State of Haryana (2014) 13 SCC 318: Referred to the principles articulated in State of Karnataka v. Krishnappa.
  • Allauddin Mian v. State of Bihar (1989) 3 SCC 5: Considered while outlining the factors governing sentence imposition.
  • Navas v. State of Kerala (2024) 14 SCC 82: Considered regarding the judicial parameters for determining quantum of sentence.
  • Parsuram v. State of M.P. (2019) 8 SCC 382: Cited and analyzed; death sentence was modified to 30 years actual imprisonment due to young age, lack of criminal antecedents, and potential for reformation.
  • Shankar Kisanrao Khade v. State of Maharashtra (2013) 5 SCC 546: Analyzed as a precedent where a death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment after evaluating crime enormity and offender profile.
  • Rajkumar v. State of M.P. (2014) 5 SCC 353: Analyzed; death sentence under Section 376 IPC was modified to 35 years of rigorous imprisonment without remission.
  • Selvam v. State (2014) 12 SCC 274: Analyzed; sentence was modified to a minimum of 30 years without remission.
  • Sundar v. State (2024) 12 SCC 764: Analyzed; sentence was reduced to 20 years rigorous imprisonment without remission considering the offender’s young age, clean record, and prison conduct.
  • Ravinder Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2024) 2 SCC 323: Analyzed; sentence was modified to a fixed term of 20 years.

Acts and Sections Mentioned

Acts

Sections & Articles

  • Section 376-D, Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Gang rape)
  • Section 376, Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Rape)
  • Section 302, Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Murder)
  • Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Constitution of India

Party

Ehsaan v. State of National Capital Territory of Delhi - Criminal Appeal No. 3267 of 2026 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 3407 of 2026) - 2026 INSC 720 - July 20, 2026 - Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sanjay Karol and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Augustine George Masih.
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